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Abstract: It is common in the legal academy to describe trends in judicial decisions 
leading to new common law rules as the result of conscious judicial effort.  Evolutionary 
models of litigation, in contrast, treat common law as resulting from pressure applied by 
litigants.  One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaining how trends in 
judicial decisions favoring one litigant, and biasing the legal standard, could occur.  This 
paper presents a model in which an apparent bias in the legal standard can occur in the 
absence of any effort toward this end on the part of judges.  Trends can develop favoring 
the better informed litigant whose case is also meritorious.  Although the model does not 
suggest an unambiguous trend toward efficient legal rules, it does show how private 
information from litigants becomes embodied in common law, an important part of the 
theory of efficient legal rules. 
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I. Introduction 
 
It is common in the legal academy to describe trends in judicial decisions, both 
those favoring plaintiffs and those favoring defendants, as the result of conscious judicial 
effort.  For example, Horwitz (1977) argued that the formulation of the negligence 
standard over the early nineteenth century occurred because judges wanted to subsidize 
the emerging railroad industry. 
 Evolutionary models of litigation, in contrast, treat common law rules as resulting 
from pressure applied by litigants.  Judges play a passive role in this view.  If the law 
moves in a direction favoring a group of defendants – say, railroads – that is merely a 
byproduct of the types of cases litigated to judgment, not any conscious effort on the part 
of judges to subsidize any particular type of potential defendant. 
 One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaining how long-term 
trends in judicial decisions favoring one litigant, and biasing the legal standard, could 
occur.   Under the prevailing theory of litigation, that of Priest and Klein (1984),1 
litigation is driven largely by uncertainty, so that litigated cases are as unpredictable as 
coin tosses.  It would seem unlikely under this model for long-term trends favoring any 
particular class of litigant to occur.  To return to Horwitz’s argument, under the 
uncertainty model of Priest and Klein, it seems unlikely that a large body of negligence 
law, providing several special rules favorable to railroad defendants, would have emerged 
from a process in which decisions favoring defendants were just as likely as those 
favoring plaintiffs.  Indeed, some have argued that courts were corrupted by powerful 
interest groups such as the railroads during the early nineteenth century (Glaeser and 
Shleifer, 2003). 
 This paper presents a model, which includes Priest-Klein as a special case, in 
which an apparent bias in the legal standard can occur in the absence of any effort toward 
this end on the part of judges.  Trends can develop favoring the better informed litigant 
(i.e., the litigant who knows whether the defendant violated the legal standard) whose 
                                                 
1 Perhaps I should describe Priest-Klein as the prevailing positive theory, since it aims to explain observed 
patterns of litigation, and has been treated in empirical papers as the prevailing theory, see Waldfogel 
(1998).  Other theories of litigation stress informational asymmetry (Bebchuk, 1984), and over-optimism 
(Shavell, 1982). 
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case is also meritorious.  To return to the Horwitz argument, uninformed plaintiffs might 
sue railroads, unsure given the size and complexity of such organizations whether the 
railroad acted negligently.  Informed railroads that are innocent of violating the legal 
standard tend to stay in court all they way to judgment and win.  As a result, they have a 
disproportionate influence on the developing legal standard.  This gives rise to an 
appearance that courts favor railroads. 
 Because this paper’s model includes Priest-Klein as a special case, the sort of 
unbiased short-run rule evolution suggested by Priest-Klein is also suggested in this 
model.  Apparently unbiased rule evolution occurs when neither plaintiff nor defendant 
has a significant informational advantage in litigation.  In contrast, apparently biased rule 
evolution occurs under informational asymmetry. 
 The model presented here has implications for the literature on the evolution of 
efficient legal rules.  The key analysis in the modern literature is that of Rubin (1977), 
which argues that common law rules tend toward efficiency over time.  This paper’s 
model does not suggest an unambiguous movement toward economically efficient legal 
rules.  However, it does show how private information becomes embodied in legal rules.  
This is an important part of an older theory of efficient legal rules that can be traced to 
Hume (1737, 484-501), Hayek (1963, 35-54), and Leoni (1961).  Hayek, in particular, 
stressed the importance of the common law process as a method of discovering private 
information on efficient norms. 
 Part II of this paper describes the literature on the economics of common law 
evolution.  Part III presents the model.  In Part IV, I summarize the empirical support for 
the model, and in Part V I discuss its implications for common law evolution. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The economic literature on legal evolution begins with Rubin (1977) (followed 
immediately by Priest (1977)).  Rubin argued that common law tends toward efficient 
legal rules.  The reason for this tendency is that inefficient legal rules create deadweight 
losses.  The gains to the parties who benefit as a result of a switch from an inefficient to 
an efficient rule exceed the losses of parties who prefer the inefficient rule.  Given this, a 
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party with a long-term stake in the efficiency of the rule has a relatively large incentive to 
litigate, until the inefficient rule is reversed.2 
 Rubin’s theory can be framed in terms of litigants’ stakes.  Asymmetric stakes 
cause parties to litigate at different rates over the long term.  Since potential beneficiaries 
of the efficient rule have greater stakes than non-beneficiaries, they have stronger 
incentives to challenge inefficient rules.3 
 More recent papers have offered a “bidding theory” in place of Rubin’s efficiency 
theory.4  Under the bidding model, common law moves in a direction that favors the 
parties that are best able to devote resources to litigate in favor of their preferred rules.  
Thus, even if Rule A is inefficient, courts may be driven to adopt it if its beneficiaries 
have an advantage relative to others in organizing and devoting resources to litigation.  
 Both the efficiency theory of Rubin and the bidding theory of more recent articles 
focus on litigation stakes.  If no one has a long-term interest in the formulation of the 
legal rule – e.g., in a world without repeat players in litigation – then there would be no 
evolutionary pressure on legal rules under either theory. 
 An alternative approach to legal evolution focuses on the information content of 
court decisions.  Priest (1980) provided the first and only paper so far to approach legal 
evolution from this perspective.  Priest questions the likelihood of efficient rules 
emerging from the litigation process.  Working with the core insights of the later-
formalized Priest-Klein model (1984), Priest argued that the disputes most likely to go all 
the way to judgment (rather than settle early) were those in which the outcome is most 
uncertain – like coin tosses.  Given the high uncertainty associated with fully litigated 
cases, the short-run evolutionary push provided by new cases is unpredictable. 
 A clearer sense of Priest’s argument might be conveyed by considering a vague 
legal standard, stated in general terms, such as the negligence standard.  A particular 
                                                 
2 Goodman (1979) presents an alternative version of this argument in which the party with a long-term 
interest in the efficient rule spends more in litigation.  The party that spends more increases its chance of 
success in litigation.  For empirical evidence on the common law efficiency hypothesis, see Mahoney 
(2001). 
3 An alternative long-run efficiency story recently advanced in Zywicki (2003) focuses on the “supply side” 
of the law.  During much of the formative period of the common law, English courts competed to attract 
litigants, since their revenues depended on court filings.  Competition, in turn, led courts to adopt efficient 
law. 
4 See Hirshleifer (1982); Bailey and Rubin (1994); Rubin, Curran, and Curran (2001).  For a related model, 
see Fon and Parisi (2003).  For a review of these theories, see Rubin (2003). 
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practice is challenged as negligent.  The challenge is most likely to go to judgment, 
according to Priest, if the standard’s application to the particular practice is highly 
uncertain – in the sense that the plaintiff and the defendant appear equally likely to win.  
Uncertainty gets resolved in favor of plaintiffs just as often as it gets resolved in favor of 
defendants, so there appears to be no biasing of the standard over time. 
 The model in this paper builds on and formalizes the approach of Priest (1980) by 
reexamining the extent to which general standards are biased by the new information 
from court decisions.  The appearance of information biasing does occur in this model.  
Under certain conditions, uncertainty tends to get resolved in favor of defendants, and 
under other conditions in favor of plaintiffs.  To observers, the cloud of uncertainty 
appears to shift in favor of one of the parties.   
 The key difference between this paper’s model and that of Priest is that this one 
allows for asymmetric information among litigants.5  Information biasing of the legal 
standard occurs in favor of the party who is both informed (i.e., has a superior prediction 
of the case outcome) and meritorious.  The reason is that informed and non-meritorious 
parties (e.g., guilty defendants) tend to settle, which leaves a relatively large share of the 
informed and meritorious litigants in the pool of cases litigated all the way to judgment.  
As a result, the information content of legal rules shifts in favor of the informed and 
meritorious party. 
 One can think of the model here as one of “micro” or “short-run” evolution 
because it focuses on short run changes in the information content of the legal standard.  
The stakes models, in contrast, focus on long-term evolutionary pressures. While the 
implications for efficiency are not straightforward, it should be clear that the information 
                                                 
5 Other papers that examine the influence of asymmetric information on litigation outcomes are Bebchuk 
(1984), Hylton (1993), Shavell (1996), and Hylton (2002).  The last three are especially relevant because 
they examine implications for trial outcome statistics, such as frequency of plaintiff victory.  One may well 
ask what this paper contributes to those.  First, unlike the earlier papers, this one provides a simple general 
model that incorporates asymmetric information models, the model of Priest (1980) and of Priest and Klein 
(1984), and that of Rubin (1977).  The key results of these models are easily derived within this paper’s 
framework.  Unlike the asymmetric information models in Bebchuk (1984), Shavell (1996), and Hylton 
(2002), this one dispenses with modeling strategic behavior, which greatly simplifies the analysis.  Second, 
unlike the earlier papers, this one establishes general results that have clear implications for the 
development of case law – e.g., the development of efficient or inefficient legal rules (Part VI.B). By 
incorporating the models of Priest (1980) and Rubin (1977), this paper provides an integrated model of 
short- and long-run legal evolution. 
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biasing identified in this paper’s model could improve the efficiency of legal rules over 
time.6 
 
III. Model 
A. Basic Components 
 
The model below focuses on the determinants of the frequency of litigation.  
Following Priest (1980), I will treat the mathematical relationship between those 
determinants and the frequency of litigation as a forcing function that determines the 
content of the law produced by courts.  The model consists of four basic components. 
 The first basic component of this model is the Landes-Posner-Gould (LPG) 
condition for litigation.  Under the LPG model, parties choose to litigate rather than settle 
a dispute if  
 
(Pp – Pd)J > C            (1) 
 
where C = the sum of the plaintiff’s litigation cost (Cp) and the defendant’s litigation cost 
(Cd), J = the dollar value of the judgment, Pp = plaintiff’s estimate of the probability of a 
verdict in his favor, Pd = defendant’s estimate of the probability of a verdict in plaintiff’s 
favor.7  I assume that the settlement cost is zero (i.e., the bargaining costs to reach 
settlement are zero).  If the LPG condition (1) holds, the set of mutually beneficial 
settlement agreements is empty, so the parties choose to litigate.8 
                                                 
6 One can think of the stakes models as describing one selection process or mechanism under which cases 
are funneled into litigation.  The information model presents an alternative selection process which operates 
generally, even on those cases that are driven by stakes pressure.  The information biasing described here 
continues to operate even when stakes are asymmetric (see Part IV infra). 
7 This model, in which differences in probability estimates drive litigation, differs from the model of Rubin 
(1977), in which differences in stakes drive litigation.  See Part IV of this paper.         
8 Recent literature has made advances on the LPG model by introducing other influences on the decision to 
settle, such as the rate of compliance with the law, credibility of the plaintiff’s threat to sue, and 
informational asymmetry, see, e.g., Hylton (2002).  By relying on the LPG framework, I am assuming that 
the nonexistence of a mutually beneficial settlement is the main determinant of litigation.  This assumption 
would be restrictive in some contexts, but not in this one.  The LPG model is appropriate here because it 
captures the influence of differential perceptions in a direct and concise manner. 
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The second basic component of this model is the assumption that each party’s 
predictions can be modeled as the sum of a rational estimate and an idiosyncratic error 
term 
 
Pp = P'p  + εp            (2) 
   
Pd = P'd  + εd            (3) 
 
If Ωp represents the information set of the plaintiff, and Ωd represents the information set 
of the defendant, then P'p  = E(Pp| Ωp) , P'd  = E(Pd| Ωd), E(εp | Ωp) = 0, E(εd | Ωd) = 0.   
 The third basic component of the model is a specification of the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s rational estimates of the probability of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.  Let 
W = probability that the defendant in a legal dispute violated the legal standard.  Let Q1 = 
probability that a defendant who has violated the legal standard will be found innocent 
(type-1 judicial error).  Let Q2 = probability that a defendant who has not violated the 
legal standard will be found guilty (type-2 judicial error).  So that courts are at least as 
accurate as coin tosses, I will assume that 1-Q1 > Q2.  The plaintiff’s rational estimate of 
a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor can be expressed as a function of the compliance and 
judicial-error probabilities: 
 
P'p = Wp(1-Q1p) + (1-Wp)Q2p ,           (4) 
 
where Wp = E(W| Ωp), Q1p = E(Q1| Ωp), Q2p = E(Q2| Ωp).  Similarly, P'd  = Wd(1-Q1d) + (1-
Wd)Q2d.  
 I will focus on two types of information set immediately below.  One is the case 
in which the litigant has minimal case-specific information and forms a rational estimate 
of the likelihood of a verdict on the plaintiff’s side using that minimal information.  This 
is the case of the uninformed litigant.  The other is the case in which a litigant has private 
information and knows whether the defendant complied with the legal standard.   
 For example, an uninformed malpractice plaintiff will know that he has been 
injured, but will not know whether the injury is due to the defendant’s negligence.  An 
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informed malpractice defendant will know not only that he has injured the patient, but 
also whether or not he was negligent. 
 In the case of the uninformed litigant, I will assume that his rational predictions 
are accurate and equal to the true case-specific probabilities of compliance and of error 
(given minimal case-specific information).  Thus, if the plaintiff is uninformed, his 
prediction is the objective probability of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, i.e., P'p  = W(1-
Q1) + (1-W)Q2.  Similarly, if the defendant is uninformed P'd  = W(1-Q1) + (1-W)Q2.  To 
simplify, let us label the objective probability of a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor 
 
ν = W(1-Q1) + (1-W)Q2            (5) 
 
If one of the parties has private information on compliance, his estimate of W is equal to 
1 in the case of non-compliance, or 0 in the case of compliance.  Thus, to take one 
example, if the defendant is informed and innocent, Pd = P'd  = Q2. 
 The fourth basic component is a heteroscedasticity assumption regarding the error 
variances of the predictions.  From the perspective of a litigant, the outcome of a dispute 
is most uncertain when the rational component of the litigants’ prediction is equal to ½.  
This is the case in which the outcome of the dispute is viewed by the litigant as a coin 
toss; the litigant may have a great deal of information on the case, but the sum total of his 
information leads him to believe that a finding of guilt (or liability) is just as likely as a 
finding of innocence (non-liability).  Consistent with Priest and Klein (1984), I will 
therefore assume that the variance of the prediction error term is a function of the rational 
component of the litigant’s prediction, and that the variance reaches a maximum when 
the rational component is ½ and with minima at 0 and 1 (see Figure 1 below). 
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B. Frequency of Litigation 
 
The probability of litigation is  
 
f = prob((Pp-Pd)J > C)                   (6) 
 
which, given (2) and (3), is  
 
( ) ′−′−>−= dpdp PPJCprobf εε .           (7) 
 
Assume εp and εd are generated by a normal distribution with variances σ2p and σ2d 
respectively, and covariance ρ.  The frequency of litigation is given by 
 
( )








−+
′−′−
Φ−= ρσσ 21 22 dp
dp PPJ
C
f             (8) 
 
where Φ  is the cumulative distribution for the standard normal variable.  The frequency 
of litigation falls as the numerator inside Φ increases and the frequency of litigation 
increases as the denominator inside Φ increases. 
 The heteroscedasticity assumption implies that as the degree of uncertainty 
concerning the judgment increases (as reflected in the variance terms in the 
denominator), the probability of litigation rises (Priest and Klein, 1984).  Given this, I 
will assume that the relationship between the prediction-error variances and ν is such that 
f forms a probability density over ν.9 
 The frequency of litigation function combines features from several models of the 
litigation process.  Note that as the cost of litigation rises, other things equal, the 
                                                 
9 To be precise,
( )




−+
−−
Φ−=
ρσσ 2)(2)(2
''
1)(
vdvp
PdP pJ
C
vf , where 1
1
0
)( =∫ dvvf . 
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probability of litigation falls, a prediction of the Landes-Posner-Gould framework.  The 
Priest-Klein model is also incorporated by the assumption of heteroscedastic prediction-
error variances. 
 Over-optimism appears as a factor that generates litigation (Shavell, 1982).  Over-
optimism is captured by the negative correlation between prediction errors, ρ < 0.  When 
the correlation between the parties’ prediction errors is negative, plaintiffs overestimate 
the size of the judgment while defendants underestimate the size of the judgment. 
 
1. Priest-Klein Case 
 
Under the Priest-Klein model, litigation is driven by uncertainty and the plaintiff 
win rate equals 50 percent.  The reason is that only disputes that are as uncertain as coin 
tosses make it all the way to judgment. 
 The frequency of litigation function is consistent with the implications of Priest-
Klein when the rational predictions of the plaintiff and the defendant are the same (P'p  = 
P'd).  In this case, the key “push factor” leading to litigation is uncertainty, as reflected in 
the error variances in the denominator of (8).  The Priest-Klein model assumes 
uncertainty regarding trial-outcome predictions increases as the defendant’s conduct 
comes closer to the legal standard, which implies that the rational component of the trial-
outcome prediction is 50 percent (P'p  = P'd  = ½).   
 A more precise description of the Priest-Klein theorem can be achieved by 
examining the plaintiff’s win rate in this model.  For any given ν, the plaintiff win rate is 
 
v
vWfvfW
QvWfQvfW =+−
−+−=
)()()1(
)1)(()()1( 12π         (9) 
 
where f(v) = 1─ Φ 


−+ ρσσ 2)(2)(2 vdvp
J
C
.  The average plaintiff win rate takes into account the 
frequency of litigation, so that 
 
 11
∫= 1
0
)( dvvvfπ           (10) 
 
Given the assumptions on the error variances (reflected in Figure 1), f is symmetric 
around v = ½.  It follows that π  = ½.10 
The essence of the Priest-Klein model is captured by assuming heteroscedastic 
error variances; in particular, the assumption that prediction error variances reach a 
maximum when the rational prediction components equal fifty percent (P'p = P'd  = ½).  
Since the pool of litigated cases will be dominated by those in which the rational 
component of the litigants’ predictions is equal to fifty percent, the average plaintiff win 
rate will be fifty percent. 
 The Priest-Klein analysis falls out of this model easily in the special case of 
Bernoulli predictions.  Suppose  
 
P
P
P
P
P
prob
prob
P
′
′−

=
1
1
0
         (11) 
 
    
d
d
d
P
P
prob
prob
P
′
′−

=
1
1
0
         (12) 
 
The probability of litigation is simply P'p(1-P'd ), which reaches its maximum at P'p = P'd  
= ½.  The most uncertain cases, in which the rational trial outcome prediction is fifty 
percent, dominate the landscape of disputes.  Average trial win rates approximate fifty 
percent. 
 
2. Asymmetric Information Case 
 
                                                 
10 The formal argument that π  = ½ is in the appendix.  Although the Priest-Klein proposition is generally 
accepted, the original article does not contain a formal proof.  The proof in the appendix of this paper, 
which shows that the Priest-Klein result follows straightforwardly from the assumption that f is symmetric 
about ν = ½, is the only simple proof of the theorem of which I am aware. 
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There are two asymmetric information cases to consider: where the defendant has 
the informational advantage and where the plaintiff has the informational advantage.   
 When the defendant has the informational advantage, the frequency of litigation 
will depend on the defendant’s type.  If the defendant is innocent, P'p = W(1-Q1) + (1-
W)Q2, P'd = Q2, and the frequency of litigation is 
 








−+
−−−
Φ−= ρσσ 2
)1(
1
22
21
dp
I
QQW
J
C
f .         (13) 
 
If the defendant is guilty, P'p  = W(1-Q1) + (1-W)Q2, P'd  = 1-Q1, and the frequency of 
litigation is 
 








−+
−−−+
Φ−= ρσσ 2
)1)(1(
1
22
21
dp
G
QQW
J
C
f  .        (14) 
 
When defendants have the informational advantage, the frequency of litigation is larger 
for cases involving innocent defendants, i.e., fI > fG.  This is because guilty defendants 
settle their cases at a higher rate than the innocent.  As a result, the plaintiff win rate is 
pushed downward from the fifty percent level. 
 For any given noncompliance probability W, the overall frequency of litigation is 
WfG + (1-W)fI, and the plaintiff’s win rate at trial is  
 
fWfW
QfWQfW
IG
IG
)1(
)1()1( 21
−+
−+−=π         (15) 
 
The average win rate is  
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    [ ]∫ −+−= 1
0
212 )1()1( dvQfWQWf IGπ         (16) 
 
The influence of innocent defendants relative to guilty defendants on the content of law 
produced by courts can be described by the ratio of the litigation frequency functions 
fI/fG.  The win rate formula implies that instead of a tendency toward 50 percent, the 
average win rate will tend toward some level less than 50 percent, i.e., ππ <2 .11 
 Now suppose the plaintiff has the informational advantage.  There are two cases 
to consider: when the plaintiff deserves to win (meritorious plaintiff), and when the 
plaintiff deserves to lose (non-meritorious plaintiff).  In the non-meritorious case, the 
plaintiff brings a claim that deserves to be called frivolous.  The plaintiff brings it 
because he knows that with probability Q2 he will be awarded damages by the court. 
 In the meritorious plaintiff case, the probability of litigation is given by 
 








−+
−−−−
Φ−= ρσσ 2
)1)(1(
1
22
21
dp
I
QQW
J
C
f .         (17) 
 
In the non-meritorious case the probability of litigation is 
 








−+
−−+
Φ−= ρσσ 2
)1(
1
22
21
dp
G
QQW
J
C
f .         (18) 
 
The “innocent” plaintiff’s (i.e., the pairing between the uninformed defendant and the 
informed and meritorious plaintiff) likelihood of litigation is larger than that of the 
“guilty” (frivolous) plaintiff.  The reason is that the guilty plaintiff tends to settle his 
claim.  This leads to high win rates, exceeding fifty percent. 
 
                                                 
11 See appendix for proof. 
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IV. Extension to Stakes 
 
The “core” model just presented focuses on uncertainty and information as the 
key push factors behind litigation.  The model can be extended easily to incorporate the 
stakes factor originally formalized in Rubin (1977).  Both the common law efficiency 
hypothesis and the more recent bidding model (which holds that common laws moves in 
the direction favored by the party with the greatest resources to devote to litigation) are 
special cases of Rubin’s stakes model. 
 Differential stakes can be incorporated in this model by letting the value of the 
judgment depend on type, so that the difference in expected awards is PpJp – PdJd.  In 
addition, let Jp = J + Tp, Jd = J + Td, where J is the damage award and Td (Tp) represents 
the present value of the defendant’s (plaintiff’s) interest in the litigation (Rubin, 1977).   
The LPG condition, (1), implies that litigation occurs when (Pp – Pd)Jp + Pd (Jp – Jd) > C.   
 In this more general formulation, the frequency of litigation is 
 
( )










−−−+
′−′−′−
Φ−= ρβσβσ
β
)1(2)1(
1
222
dp
ddp
p
PPP
J
C
f  ,         (19) 
 
where β =
pTD
dTpT
+
− .  If the plaintiff has greater stakes, 0 < β <1, and if the defendant has 
greater stakes β < 0.  Clearly, if the plaintiff and the defendant have symmetric stakes (Tp 
= Td), this reduces to the information model of the previous section.  Introducing stakes 
adds new results to the model of the previous section only when stakes are asymmetric. 
 The results can be summarized as follows.  In the Priest-Klein case, the plaintiff 
win rate exceeds (is less than) fifty percent when the plaintiff (defendant) has the greater 
stakes, which is a well-known result of the Priest-Klein model.12  In the asymmetric 
information case, we have instances in which the stakes-based and information-based 
push factors work at cross purposes.  For example, when the defendant has the 
                                                 
12 The proof is in the appendix.  Although this is a well known result, I am not aware of a neat proof of it – 
other than the one in the appendix of this paper. 
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informational advantage, the plaintiff, motivated by his greater stakes, will litigate more 
frequently against guilty defendants than in the case of symmetric stakes.  Still, the 
results of the asymmetric information model survive: fI/fG > 1 even in the presence of the 
stakes incentive.13 
 
V. Empirical Support 
 
As a general matter, the predictions of this model are borne out in the data on 
plaintiff win rates (Hylton, 1993).  Observed win rates frequently differ from the fifty 
percent level predicted by the Priest-Klein model when stakes are symmetric.  Only two 
theories exist to explain these deviations from fifty percent: asymmetric stakes and 
asymmetric information.  The asymmetric information theory seems to be more 
consistent with the data. 
For example, win rates for contract actions tend to be greater than those for tort 
actions (Eisenberg, 1990, p.357).  This makes sense under the asymmetric information 
theory.  Tort actions often involve defendants with private information on their own 
compliance with the legal standard.  Contract actions, in comparison, generally look at 
the conduct of both parties in relation to objective rules governing offer and acceptance.  
Since defendant-side informational advantage is more common in the tort setting, lower 
plaintiff win rates are predicted under the informational asymmetry model.  The 
asymmetric stakes theory, on the other hand, could explain this pattern only if plaintiffs 
generally have greater stakes in contract than in tort actions. 
Areas of law in which defendants are likely to have a substantial informational 
advantage over plaintiffs report plaintiff win rates well below fifty percent.  Two areas in 
which such a disparity is observed are products liability and medical malpractice tort 
actions.  Products liability is governed largely by the “risk-utility” standard, which is a 
type of negligence test that focuses on the incremental risk and incremental utility 
presented by the defendant’s design in comparison with a safer alternative.  The standard 
gives the defendant an informational advantage over the plaintiff.  Similarly, the 
negligence standard for medical malpractice, which is based on the doctor’s compliance 
                                                 
13 See appendix. 
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with medical custom, gives the doctor an informational advantage over the plaintiff.  In 
both products liability and medical malpractice, plaintiff win rates are consistently below 
fifty percent (e.g., Eisenberg, 1990).     
 Even within the products liability category, win rate patterns are more consistent 
with the asymmetric information theory than with the asymmetric stakes theory.  When 
the plaintiffs bring products liability claims based on contract – e.g., a claim that the 
product failed to perform as warranted – plaintiff win rates tend to be greater than fifty 
percent.14  What explains the difference between plaintiff win rates for product-liability 
tort actions (low) and product-liability contract actions (high)? 
 The asymmetric information model suggests that the key difference between 
product-liability contract and product-liability tort actions is that the defendant does not 
have an informational advantage under the legal standard used in the contract actions.  
Those standards come in essentially two varieties: express and implied warranty rules.  
Express warranties are simply the terms of the contract, and there is no reason to believe 
that either party has an informational advantage in reading the contract.  However, 
contract law doctrines generally favor the consumer in these cases.  Since state courts are 
rather idiosyncratic in this regard, it is quite possible that lawyers on the plaintiff’s side, 
who are more likely than the product seller’s lawyers to be familiar with the law and the 
behavior of juries in their jurisdiction, generally have the best prediction of the effective 
legal standard.  In the case of implied warranties, the court’s determination of a contract 
breach will often depend on the type of use to which the consumer put the product.  In 
these cases, the plaintiff-consumer is again likely to have an informational advantage. 
 In contrast to the asymmetric information theory, the stakes theory fails to explain 
the pattern of win rates observed within the products liability category.  If defendants 
have greater stakes in these cases, as the stakes theory posits, they should tend to win 
more often than plaintiffs both in product-liability tort actions and in product-liability 
contract actions.  But we see the opposite in the case of product-liability contract actions. 
 
VI. Implications for Common Law Evolution 
 
                                                 
14 Eisenberg (1990) reports .57 in the case of contract-based actions, .25 for tort-based actions. 
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The implications of this model for legal evolution are straightforward.  The 
direction of the law is influenced by the “litigation likelihood ratio” of innocent to guilty 
litigants, fI/fG.  This is so even when stakes are asymmetric. 
 In the Priest-Klein case in which the rational components of the litigant’s 
predictions are the same, the litigation likelihood ratio is equal to one.  The results are 
those explained by Priest (1980) (assuming stakes are symmetric).  Law does not evolve 
in a direction that favors any party – the guilty or the innocent.  One might describe this 
type of evolution as a random walk, in the sense that the law is equally likely to move in 
a direction favoring plaintiffs as it is to move in a direction favoring defendants. 
 The more interesting cases are the two involving asymmetric information, where 
the defendant has the informational advantage and where the plaintiff has the 
informational advantage.  In each case, the model shows that the relative frequency of 
litigation favors the party who is both informed and has the strongest case, i.e., fI/fG > 1.  
Informed defendants that are innocent, and informed plaintiffs that have meritorious 
claims, are most likely to litigate to judgment and to win their cases.  In this process, the 
law should come over time to embody the information that those plaintiffs have with 
respect to their types of case. 
 So far, this model tells a story about “micro-evolution” in which existing legal 
rules are shaped, in the asymmetric information setting, by the information provided by 
“innocent” litigants in court.  To take a concrete example, suppose we are considering a 
medical malpractice claim.  The legal standard is negligence.  Suppose the plaintiff is 
uninformed as to the doctor’s potential compliance with the standard, while the doctor is 
far better informed. 
 This model implies that the negligence standard in medical malpractice is infused, 
over time, disproportionately by the information provided by innocent doctors.  The 
negligence standard is somewhat ambiguous a priori.  Litigation gives the standard a 
definite form, in the sense that certain types of conduct are deemed to be non-negligent 
and other types negligent.  The case law will be “informationally biased” in the sense that 
it tends largely to identify specific types of non-negligent conduct under the standard. 
 This informational bias could also lead to “rule evolution” over time, as the 
information embodied in legal rules alters the nature of the rule itself.  Consider the 
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medical malpractice example again.  Negligence determinations today are made chiefly 
by referring to the custom of the profession.  The emergence and resilience of the custom 
rule in medical malpractice may be in large part because the case law, defining so many 
specific types of conduct deemed to be non-negligent, has in effect generated the custom 
rule to supplant the relatively ambiguous negligence test. 
 
A. Evolution of Efficient Legal Rules 
 
That the law comes to favor the informed and meritorious party in asymmetric 
information settings seems consistent with the common-law efficiency hypothesis.  Legal 
rules in many contexts are ambiguous, depending on terms such as “reasonableness.”  
Where the rules are not ambiguous, they may need to be updated over time to reflect 
changes in tastes or technology.  The litigation process described in this model permits 
that to occur in a manner that could enhance the efficiency of legal rules.  The party in a 
legal dispute who is likely to be in the best position to improve the efficiency of a legal 
rule is the party that is both informed and meritorious. 
 Consider the negligence rule of tort law.  In early judicial opinions, the negligence 
rule is described as requiring reasonable conduct on the part of the defendant.  In modern 
opinions, the rule is sometimes described as a cost-benefit test, under which courts 
compare the incremental losses that could be avoided by additional care with the cost of 
that care.  Judge Learned Hand described the test as a comparison between, on one hand, 
the burden of additional precaution and, on the other hand, the probability of harm 
multiplied by the severity of the harm.15  Richard Posner has described the test as an 
economically efficient legal rule:  
When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational 
profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to accident victims 
rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability.  Furthermore, overall 
economic value or welfare would be diminished rather than increased by 
incurring a higher accident-prevention cost in order to avoid a lower 
accident cost. (Posner, 1972) 
                                                 
15 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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 Anyone who has become involved even peripherally in litigation knows that the 
social desirability of the negligence standard depends on how it is implemented.  If a 
court fails to measure the burden of precaution or the expected marginal losses with 
acceptable accuracy, the negligence test will result in inefficient outcomes, no matter how 
the test is framed verbally.  The litigation process, as described by this model, has the 
desirable feature of maximizing the likelihood that the negligence test will be applied in a 
manner that is economically efficient. 
 The custom rule in medical malpractice serves as an example of a highly-specific 
negligence rule that is probably efficient.  Leaving it up to the individual court to 
determine negligence under a general cost-benefit test would be administratively 
expensive and could easily generate too much uncertainty to provide guidance to 
physicians.  Moreover, market pressures already encourage physicians to adopt methods 
that are efficient in the sense of minimizing the sum of the costs of accidental injuries and 
accident avoidance. 
 
B. Evolution of Inefficient Rules 
 
The information biasing that occurs in this model could have an undesirable 
influence on the law.  Suppose the parties agree on the merits (facts and law) and 
disagree on their estimates of the likelihood of judicial error.  The difference in their 
predictions can be expressed as 
  
   Pp – Pd = W(Q1d – Q1p) + (1-W)(Q2p – Q2d) + εp – εd  ,            (20) 
 
which implies that uncertainty pushing parties to litigate can be decomposed into white 
noise and differences in estimates of the judicial error probabilities.  Since I am not 
assuming informational asymmetry with respect to the merits of a lawsuit, the Priest-
Klein analysis applies to this case.  I will treat the Priest-Klein case as the benchmark 
against which this case is compared.  As a preliminary matter, note that if the judge’s 
prejudices were well known, the litigants’ judicial-error predictions would be the same 
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(Q1p = Q1d, Q2p = Q2d) and white noise would drive the litigation process, as in the Priest-
Klein model.16 
 Suppose the plaintiff is both relatively optimistic as to the likelihood of an 
erroneous finding of liability against an innocent defendant (Q2p > Q2d) and relatively 
pessimistic as to the likelihood of an error favoring a guilty defendant (Q1d > Q1p).  This 
is the case of plaintiff relative optimism with respect to judicial errors. The probability of 
litigation is 
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Since the difference between the litigants’ rational predictions (the second term in the 
numerator) is positive, the probability of litigation is greater than in the Priest-Klein 
(white noise) case. 
 Implications for the evolution of legal standards depend on whether relatively 
optimistic plaintiffs have valid beliefs.  Suppose the plaintiff’s relative optimism is valid 
– e.g., plaintiff has private information on the judge’s prejudices that is not available to 
defendant.  Since the defendant’s prediction of the plaintiff’s probability of success is 
always too low relative to the best prediction, the error variance distribution for the 
defendant is to the right of that for the plaintiff, as shown in Figure 2.  The sum of the 
error variances reaches a maximum between 50 percent (maximum variance estimate for 
plaintiff) and the maximum variance estimate of the defendant.  The plaintiff win rate, 
determined by the point at which the sum of prediction-error variances reaches a 
maximum (point A, figure 2), exceeds 50 percent.17 
                                                 
16The other case in which prejudices would not influence litigation is when the prejudice-induced optimism 
of the non-frivolous plaintiff (overestimating his chance that prejudicial error advantages him) is perfectly 
offset by the prejudice-induced pessimism (underestimating his chance that prejudicial error advantages 
him) of the innocent defendant (W(Q1d – Q1p) + (1-W)(Q2p –Q2d) = 0), again leaving white noise as the sole 
uncertainty component leading to litigation.  
17 The intuitive story here is that the defendant is relatively pessimistic from the plaintiff’s perspective and 
relatively optimistic from his own.  He refuses to settle cases that a better-informed defendant would settle, 
and as a result loses more frequently. 
 21
 
 
 
 
22 , dp σσ  
221 )1( QQQW +−−=ν  0 10.5
Figure 2 
 A
2
pσ  2dσ
 22
 Information biasing that occurs because of the plaintiff’s superior knowledge 
regarding judicial prejudices should be a fragile, short-run phenomenon.  If defendants 
consistently do worse then they expected in court, they will adjust their expectations 
downward, until the 50 percent win rate is re-established.18  If the assumptions are 
reversed, so that the defendant is relatively optimistic and has the information advantage 
in predicting judicial error, the short run result would be a plaintiff win rate less than 50 
percent, and this would hold until plaintiffs adjusted their expectations.19 
 Holding to the assumption that the plaintiff has private information on the 
likelihood of judicial error and is relatively optimistic in the sense defined above, what 
does this model imply for the evolution of legal standards?  Since the plaintiff win rate 
exceeds 50 percent in the short run, the legal standard will appear to be biased in favor of 
the plaintiff and will be modified in the short run to incorporate judicial biases favoring 
the plaintiff. 
 One can think of this case as a failure of the rule of law.  Insiders gain knowledge 
of the prejudices of judges, or perhaps influence those prejudices, and legal rules are 
distorted in their favor as a result.  The law becomes less predictable to those unaware of 
the judges’ biases.  Since rules are modified in the short run to incorporate judicial biases, 
inefficient legal rules are likely to result. 
 
C. Rule Evolution Generally (Three processes) 
 
In the general case in which the litigants’ perceptions of the merits and the 
likelihood of judicial error differ, the difference in the litigants’ predictions of the 
probability of plaintiff success can be expressed as 
 
Pp –  Pd = (Wp- Wd)(1-Q1d-Q2d) 
                                                 
18 An exception might be observed in the case where one side is a one-shot player and the other a repeat 
player.  Consider, again, the example of local product liability lawyers going against an out-of-state seller.  
The one-shot player (out-of-state seller) may not gain sufficient experience to adjust its expectations on the 
likelihood of prejudice-induced error. 
19 Obviously, there are other cases that to consider, where the results follow easily from this argument: 
where the plaintiff has the information advantage and is relatively pessimistic (regarding plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success), where the defendant has the information advantage and is relatively pessimistic 
(regarding plaintiff’s likelihood of success). 
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 + W(Q1d – Q1p) + (1-W)(Q2p – Q2d) + εp – εd         (22) 
 
Thus, the uncertainty that pushes parties into litigation can be decomposed into parts 
reflecting differential information with respect to the merits (facts and law), differential 
information with respect to the likelihood of judicial error (e.g., insider knowledge of 
judicial biases), and white noise. 
 In this model of short run evolution, there are three evolutionary processes 
suggested: asymmetric information, favoring the party that is both informed and 
meritorious; asymmetric access, favoring the party with better knowledge of judicial 
prejudices; and white noise, favoring neither party and exhibiting high short-run 
indeterminacy.  All three processes may be at work at any time. 
 These three processes connect to long-standing arguments in the law literature.  
Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that legal standards become more certain or predictable 
over time, as a consequence of litigation.20  The asymmetric-information and white-noise 
process are consistent with this view.  Bentham, on the other hand, argued that common 
law was inherently uncertain and unpredictable, and always subject to official discretion 
(Postema, 1986).  The asymmetric-access process generates short run evolution 
consistent with Bentham’s view of the litigation process. 
 The common law efficiency hypothesis is a relatively recent development in the 
legal evolution literature.  The dominant theory, due to Rubin, is one of long-run 
evolutionary pressure, driven by differences in litigants’ stakes rather than information.  
Inefficient legal rules are challenged more frequently than efficient legal rules, and, as a 
result, are more likely to be overturned.  The model in this paper is easily reconcilable 
with Rubin’s.  The three short run processes identified in this model could co-exist with 
long run pressure toward efficiency.  Indeed, this model’s finding that the content of 
common law is disproportionately influenced by informed and meritorious litigants 
provides more support to the efficiency thesis.21 
                                                 
20 Holmes (1881), 111-29. 
21 Of the three short-run processes identified here, the asymmetric-access process has potentially troubling 
implications for the efficiency thesis.  If common law rules are under constant short-term pressure to be 
distorted to favor insiders, then it is difficult to see how an efficient rule could last long.  On the other hand, 
the asymmetric-access process, as noted earlier, is the most fragile of the three identified in this model – 
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More recent literature has replaced the common law efficiency hypothesis with a 
bidding model in which common law is under pressure to favor the parties with both a 
long-term stake in a specific legal rule and the resources to litigate in their interests.  The 
result of this pressure could be an efficient or inefficient rule.  For present purposes, the 
key thing to note about the bidding model is that it is simply a version of the stakes 
model. 
 The information-based model presented here has implications that modify those 
of the bidding model.  The most interesting is suggested by the combination of the 
bidding model (as a description of long run evolution) and the asymmetric-information 
process as a description of short-term pressure.  The short-term biasing in favor of 
informed and meritorious litigants that occurs under the asymmetric-information process 
provides a countervailing force against the long-term pressure toward an inefficient rule 
under the bidding model.  As Part IV of this paper shows, even in the case of asymmetric 
stakes, the case law’s information content continues to be biased in favor of the informed 
and meritorious litigant.  Because of this information biasing, the common law process 
has an inbuilt brake on the degree to which interest groups can use it to establish 
inefficient rules. 
 
D. Pace of Legal Change  
 
J. Robert S. Prichard (1988) argued that the rules governing the allocation of legal 
expenses affect the pace of legal change.  Prichard suggested that British law is more 
rule-based and predictable because the British rule for allocating legal costs (loser pays) 
acts as a subsidy for litigation.  Litigation, because it occurs more frequently, leads to a 
more steady pace of rule clarification, a process in which legal change appears to be 
marginal and conservative in comparison to the American legal system. 
 It is straightforward to show in this model that the British rule on legal expenses 
generates a higher frequency of litigation.  The more interesting question is how this 
affects the three evolutionary processes identified here.   
                                                                                                                                                 
because outsiders (e.g., those who don’t have information on judicial prejudices) will adjust their 
expectations until the white noise process emerges. 
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 Consider, first, the white noise (Priest-Klein) process.  More frequent and cheaper 
litigation implies that the degree of uncertainty necessary to generate litigation falls.  
Although the resulting law appears to move with equal likelihood in a pro-plaintiff or 
pro-defendant direction, the shifts are more frequent and of smaller magnitude.  Rule 
clarification occurs in a smoother, more continuous way, as Prichard claimed.  Similarly, 
under the asymmetric-information process, the law’s apparent shift in favor of the 
informed and meritorious party would occur in a more continuous fashion.  Under the 
asymmetric-access process, rules are distorted more consistently by official discretion. 
 Georgakapoulos (1999) presents a model of legal evolution in which common law 
generates smoother, more continuous change in legal rules than statute law.  Assuming 
risk aversion and switching costs, he argues that common law is preferable to statute law, 
given the necessity for law to keep up with changes in tastes and technology.  The 
argument formalizes that of Leoni (1961, pp.59-96).  The same argument can be applied 
to this analysis of legal change.  Assuming risk aversion or costs to conforming to 
changes in the law, the British rule is preferable to the American rule. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Theories of legal evolution fall into two categories: judicial-effort and 
evolutionary theories.  Evolutionary models, in turn, are either ones describing long-run 
evolutionary pressure, most of them building on the seminal paper of Rubin (1977), or 
short-run evolutionary analyses such as that of Priest (1980).  This paper has advanced 
the short-run evolutionary analysis by presenting a model that includes both Priest-Klein 
and asymmetric information models as special cases. 
 The short-run evolutionary model of this paper does not suggest a clear trend 
toward efficient rules, as was first argued by Rubin in his discussion of long-run 
pressures.  However, the model does show how private information becomes embodied in 
legal rules over time, which is a key part of the efficiency theories of common law dating 
back to Hume, and more recently, Hayek. 
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Since f is symmetric around ν = ½, the cumulative distribution can be graphed as follows: 
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Using this graph, it follows that 1)1( =F  and 
2
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=∫ dvvF .  Thus, 21=π .  Alternatively, 
using a well-known formula for expected value (in conjunction with figure A1), 
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Proof that 2ππ < : 
The suggested inequality holds if: 
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Recall that QWQWv 21 )1()1( −+−= .  Thus, (A3) holds if 
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Moreover, it is sufficient, for (A4) to hold, that 
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or, equivalently,  
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Since the first and third terms on the right cancel, we have 
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which holds, because ff GI >  for 0 1<< v .■ 
 
Stakes Model 
Priest-Klein case: 
The following argument shows that the plaintiff win rate exceeds (is less than) 
fifty percent if plaintiff (defendant) has greater stakes.  Under Priest-Klein assumptions 
P'p = P'd  = ½, and the probability of litigation function is 
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where the variance terms reach a maximum at v = ½.  Taking the derivative of f and 
evaluating at v = ½, the sign of the derivative is simply the sign of β.  Thus, if the plaintiff 
has greater stakes, β > 0, and the frequency of litigation is maximized at some v > ½.  
Similarly, if the defendant has greater stakes, β < 0, and the frequency of litigation 
reaches a maximum at v < ½.■ 
 
Asymmetric Information case:  
The following argument shows that the implications of the asymmetric 
information continue to hold in the asymmetric information scenario.  Suppose the 
defendant has the informational advantage.  If the defendant is innocent, litigation occurs 
when 
221 )1()1( QQQWJ
C
p
dp βεβε −−−−>−−      (A10) 
If the defendant is guilty, litigation occurs when 
)1()1)(1()1( 121 QQQWJ
C
p
dp −−−−−−>−− βεβε     (A11) 
The frequency of litigation is greater when the defendant is innocent if W(1-Q1-Q2) – βQ2 
> (W-1)(1-Q1-Q2) + β(1-Q1), which holds, given that β <1.  It follows that in the case in 
which stakes are asymmetric and the defendant has the informational advantage, fI/fG > 1.  
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Now suppose the plaintiff has the informational advantage.  When the plaintiff’s case is 
meritorious, litigation occurs when 
])1()1([)1)(1()1( 2121 QWQWQQWJ
C
p
dp −+−−−−−−>−− βεβε .   (A12) 
When the plaintiff’s case is not meritorious, litigation occurs when 
])1()1([)1()1( 2121 QWQWQQWJ
C
p
dp −+−−−−+>−− βεβε .    (A13) 
Clearly, litigation is more likely to occur when the plaintiff’s case is meritorious, and this 
is so whatever the value of β.  Hence, when stakes are asymmetric and the plaintiff has 
the informational advantage, fI/fG >1.■ 
 
